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even at subclinical levels, anxiety and depression are associated with impaired cognitive control. it 
is unclear, though, to what extent these deficits reflect a common underlying dysfunction. Using a 
non-affective hybrid masked prime-simon task, we obtained several measures of within- and be-
tween-trial inhibitory behavioral control in 80 young, healthy volunteers, together with measures 
of their anxiety and depression levels. neither depression nor anxiety affected low-level within-trial 
control, or any of the between-trial control measures. however, increased levels of depression, but 
not of anxiety, were associated with impaired high-level within-trial control (increased simon ef-
fect). results indicate that depression, but not anxiety, impairs voluntary online response-control 
mechanisms independent of affective content.
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IntroductIon
Anxiety  disorders  and  depression  are  typically  associated  with 
dysfunctional cognitive control, specifically in the form of an atten-
tional bias towards negative information (e.g., Cisler & Koster, 2010; 
Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010) and impaired inhibitory control 
(e.g., Channon & Green, 1999; Kaiser et al., 2003). Despite the high 
comorbidity of these two disorders (75% and above; e.g., Lamers et 
al., 2001), which points to a common etiology, anxiety and depression 
have different underlying neural correlates (e.g., Broyd et al., 2009; 
Liotti & Mayberg, 2001; van Tol et al., 2010). However, both are as-
sociated  with  structural  and  functional  abnormalities  in  prefrontal 
cortical regions (for a recent review, see Mitchell, 2011), most notably 
a reduced volume of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; e.g., 
van Tol et al., 2010). This structure is widely believed to be critically 
involved in inhibitory cognitive control (see e.g., Carter & van Veen, 
2007). Its supposed role is to detect conflict between competing neural 
representations in the perceptuo-motor system, and to issue a signal 
to the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) to adjust the system to-
wards a more “cautious” mode. 
While major depression and clinical anxiety disorders are crippling 
illnesses severely affecting a person’s life, some of their symptoms – 
like those of other disorders – are experienced in a milder form even 
by psychologically healthy individuals. Yet even at subclinical levels, 
anxiety and depression can adversely affect inhibitory cognitive control 
(e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2010, 2011; Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 
2008;  Avila  &  Parcet,  2002;  Holmes  &  Pizzagalli,  2007).  Similarly, 
like clinical anxiety and depression, their subclinical symptoms show 
some relationship to reduced activity within anterior cortical control 
structures: For instance, levels of subclinical anxiety have been found 
to be inversely related to dlPFC activity in a conflict task (Bishop, 
2008), and there is some evidence of an inverse relationship between 
subclinical  depression  (and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  between  subclinical 
anxiety) and the resting-state activity of the ACC (Wacker, Dillon, 
&  Pizzagalli,  2009).  Finally,  again  like  clinical  anxiety  and  depres-
sion, elevated levels of subclinical anxiety and depression symptoms 
frequently  occur  together  (Barlow  &  Campbell,  2000),  suggesting 
a common underlying cause. This, however, poses a major theoreti-
cal obstacle to the interpretation of the above-mentioned findings: If 
anxiety and depression are, in fact, related but separate dysfunctions, 
then their frequent co-occurrence results in a substantial confound 
– any inhibitory deficit attributed to anxiety might have been driven 
by elevated levels of depression, and vice versa, if care is not taken to AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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account for one while investigating the other. However, to the best of 
our knowledge, there has been no attempt yet to tease apart the respec-
tive impact of subclinical anxiety and depression levels on inhibitory   
cognitive control. 
The present study was designed to address this issue with regard 
to inhibitory deficits in the perceptuo-motor domain.1 We were par-
ticularly interested in separating the effects of anxious or depressed 
affect  from  affective  processing  (i.e.,  the  processing  of  emotionally 
valenced stimulus material). Therefore, we employed a non-affective 
perceptuo-motor control task using emotionally neutral stimuli. In ad-
dition, we measured participants’ level of anxiety and depression using 
self-assessment questionnaires. 
ExpErImEnt
Behavioral inhibitory effects being 
measured
The present study employed an emotionally neutral hybrid masked 
prime-Simon  task  (see  Maylor,  Birak,  &  Schlaghecken,  2011; 
Schlaghecken, Refaat, & Maylor, 2011). In this task, participants have 
to give a spatially corresponding manual response to the direction of 
an arrow stimulus (e.g., left-hand response to a left-pointing arrow). 
Each target is presented at a (task-irrelevant) left or right-hand screen 
location, and is preceded by a (task-irrelevant) centrally presented, 
backward-masked  arrow  prime.  Prime  identity  and  target  location 
randomly  and  independently  match  or  mismatch  the  required  re-
sponse. On prime-compatible trials, prime and target are associated 
with the same response, on prime-incompatible trials, they are associ-
ated with opposite responses. On location-congruent trials, response 
hand and target location match (e.g., a left-pointing arrow, requiring 
a left-hand response, appears on the left-hand side of the screen); on 
location-incongruent trials, they mismatch (e.g., a left-pointing arrow, 
requiring a left-hand response, appears on the right-hand side). This 
paradigm  allows  us  to  measure  a  number  of  behavioral  inhibitory   
effects:
Negative compatibility effect (Nce) 
Although  masked  primes  are  inaccessible  to  conscious  aware-
ness  (e.g.,  Eimer  &  Schlaghecken,  2002;  Schlaghecken,  Birak,  & 
Maylor, 2011), they systematically affect responses to the target, with 
slower and more error-prone responses on prime-compatible than on 
prime-incompatible trials. The NCE has been interpreted as reflect-
ing a fast inhibition of the response tendency initially triggered by 
the prime (Boy, Clarke, & Sumner, 2008; Jaśkowski, 2008; Jaśkowski 
& Przekoracka-Krawczyk, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002, 2006; 
Schlaghecken, Klapp, & Maylor, 2009; Schlaghecken, Rowley, Sembi, 
Simmons, & Whitcomb, 2007; Sumner, 2008): If the target requires the 
same response as the prime, this just-inhibited response has to be re-
activated, resulting in longer response latencies, whereas if the target 
requires the opposite response, the non-inhibited (and possibly even 
disinhibited; cf. Schlaghecken, Bowman, & Eimer, 2006) response can 
be executed quickly and accurately. A notable feature of the NCE is 
that in young, healthy adults, it develops very quickly, reaching its peak 
at masked prime-target intervals of 150-200 ms (e.g., Schlaghecken, 
Birak, & Maylor, 2011; Sumner & Brandwood, 2008). In older adults, 
however, it is virtually absent within this time window (Maylor et al., 
2011; Schlaghecken & Maylor, 2005).2 The effects of depression on 
perceptuo-motor control bear some similarity to those of normal ag-
ing (e.g., Seidler et al., 2010). To the extent that this holds for subclini-
cal depressive symptoms as well, one might expect that in the present 
study, elevated levels of depression are associated with reduced or even 
absent NCEs.3
SimoN effect 
Responses  are  typically  faster  on  location-congruent  than  on 
location-incongruent trials, as an incorrect response tendency – trig-
gered automatically by the incongruent target location – has to be 
overcome before a correct response can be executed (e.g., Stürmer, 
Siggelkow,  Dengler,  &  Leuthold,  2000).  Consequently,  the  mag-
nitude of the Simon effect represents a measure of the strength of 
inhibitory control: In a system that deals efficiently with the inter-
fering response tendency, location-incongruent responses will only 
be slightly delayed, whereas in a system with inefficient interference 
suppression, they will be substantially delayed.4 Thus to the extent 
that subclinical anxiety and depression affect response inhibition, we 
expect larger Simon effects in participants with higher levels of anxiety   
and depression.
grattoN effect 
Cognitive control is not restricted to dealing with already-present 
conflicts. Arguably, an even more important task is to dynamically 
adjust neural processing to the presence or absence of conflict in the 
environment, and such influences can be measured as sequential ef-
fects in response conflict paradigms like the Simon task. Simon effect 
magnitude varies as a function of the congruency of the preceding trial: 
Following a location-congruent trial, Simon effects are typically much 
larger than following a location-incongruent trial, where they might 
be absent or even reversed. This sequential modulation of interference 
effects is known as the Gratton effect (e.g., Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 
1992; Stürmer et al., 2000; Wühr & Ansorge, 2005). As a second-order 
effect, the relationship between Gratton effect magnitude and strength 
of inhibitory control is not straight-forward. On the one hand, a small 
Gratton effect might be due to already-small Simon effects following 
location-congruent trials, indicating strong inhibitory control. On the 
other hand, it might be due to relatively large Simon effects following 
location-incongruent trials, indicating weak inhibitory control. Thus 
the pattern of reaction times across the four trial conditions (congruent 
followed by congruent [cC], congruent followed by incongruent [cI], 
incongruent followed by congruent [iC], and incongruent followed by 
incongruent [iI]) will be a better indicator of the strength of inhibitory 
control than the Gratton effect as such. Specifically, a deficit of dy-
namic inhibitory adjustment should be reflected in longer iI reaction   
times.5AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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poSt-error SlowiNg (peS) 
Responses are typically slower and more likely to be correct follow-
ing an incorrect than following a correct response. There are various 
reasons for this. First, similar to the Gratton effect, PES might reflect an 
anticipatory adjustment: Participants might voluntarily suppress acti- 
vity in the perceptuo-motor system in order to minimize the chance 
for a subsequent error (e.g., Carter & van Veen, 2007). Second, they 
might  not  yet  have  overcome  the  processing  problem  that  caused 
the error in the preceding trial (e.g., Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & 
Donchin, 1993). Third, the error, because of its relative rarity, might 
have drawn the participant’s attention away from the task at hand (e.g., 
Notebaert et al., 2009).6 For more anxious participants, committing 
an error might appear particularly “threatening”, whereas there is no 
reason to believe that the same is true for more depressed participants. 
Thus anxiety, but not depression, might make one particularly prone 
to the attention-orienting mechanism of PES, suggesting that higher 
levels of anxiety, but not higher levels of depression, might be asso-
ciated with larger PES. This has indeed been confirmed at least for 
introverts (Robinson, Meier, Wilkowski, & Ode, 2007). Patients suf-
fering from clinical depression, on the other hand, largely fail to show 
PES, possibly reflecting a more general state of blunted responses to 
environmental or feedback information (Steele, Kumar, & Ebmeier, 
2007).  Even  at  subclinical  levels,  participants  with  higher  depres-
sion scores not only failed to show PES, but also failed to show the 
usual improved post-error accuracy (Pizzagalli, Peccoralo, Davidson,   
& Cohen, 2006).
poSt-coNflict SlowiNg (pcS) 
Even following a correct response, responses are typically slower 
following an incongruent trial than following a congruent trial (e.g., 
Schlaghecken, Refaat, & Maylor, 2011). This might merely reflect a 
“passive” self-organization mechanism (e.g., Laming, 1979; Van Orden, 
Holdern, & Turvey, 2005). Alternatively, however, PCS might represent 
a form of inhibitory context adaptation (i.e., a deliberate slowing of re-
sponses if the immediate context contained a slow response), and as such 
might be affected by elevated levels of anxiety or depression symptoms.
In the following, we will refer to the last four of these effects (Simon 
effect, Gratton effect, PES, and PCS) as reflecting “high-level” control 
processes: These are processes triggered by a consciously perceived 
conflict, and there is evidence that at least the first three are medi-
ated by the same (or highly overlapping) anterior cortical structures 
(e.g., Carter & van Veen, 2007; Morishima, Okuda, & Sakai, 2010). 
Consequently,  we  will  refer  to  the  NCE  as  reflecting  a  “low-level” 
control process, that is, a process which (a) inhibits a motor tendency 
triggered by a non-consciously perceived stimulus, and which (b) ap-
pears to be mediated by basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuits rather 
than by the anterior control system (Aron et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
we will refer to the NCE and the Simon effect as effects reflecting 
“within-trial” or “online” inhibitory control, and to the Gratton effect, 
PES, and PCS as reflecting “between-trial” or “adaptive” inhibitory   
control.
Method
participaNtS
Eighty-three students of the University of Warwick (37 male), aged 
17 to 25 years (M = 20.3, SD = 1.4), participated in the experiment. All 
but six participants were right-handed. 
apparatuS aNd Stimuli
Hybrid masked prime-Simon task
Left-  and  right-pointing  double  arrows  (<<  and  >>) served as 
prime and target stimuli, subtending a visual angle of approximately 
1.6º × 0.7º. Masks were constructed on the basis of a virtual 9 × 9 grid, 
randomly filled with overlapping horizontal, vertical, and oblique lines 
of different lengths (none of them having the same orientation as the 
lines making up the arrow stimuli), resulting in a roughly rectangu-
lar array of approximately 4.6º × 2.0º. A new random mask was cre-
ated on each trial in order to avoid perceptual learning of the mask 
and  correspondingly  increased  prime  identification  (Schlaghecken, 
Blagrove,  &  Maylor,  2008;  Schubö,  Schlaghecken,  &  Meinecke, 
2001). Stimuli were presented in black on white on a 15’’ computer   
screen.
Zung Self-rating depression Scale (ZSdS) and Zung Self-
rating anxiety Scale (ZSaS)
The  ZSDS  (Zung,  1965)  is  a  20-item  self-report  questionnaire 
measuring  cognitive,  mood,  and  somatic  symptoms  of  depression 
(Passik et al., 2000). Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale. 
The ZSDS has good reliability and validity (e.g., Dugan et al., 1998). 
The ZSAS (Zung, 1971) is a 20-item self-report questionnaire measur-
ing symptoms of anxiety disorder, specifically feelings of anxiousness 
and panic, vestibular and gastrointestinal/muscular sensations, and 
somatic control (Olatunji, Deacon, Adramowitz, & Tolin, 2006). Each 
item is rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale. The ZSAS has good reli-
ability and validity (e.g., Olatunji et al., 2006).
procedure 
Participants  were  seated  in  a  dimly  lit  room  approximately   
60 cm in front of a computer screen. In the first part of the experiment, 
they completed the hybrid masked prime-Simon task. As shown in   
Figure 1, each trial began with a centrally presented prime (33 ms), 
followed immediately by a mask (100 ms). After a 100-ms blank, a 
target was presented for 100 ms, approximately 14º to the left or right 
of fixation.  Inter-trial interval was 1,460 ms. Response keys were the 
left and right SHIFT keys on a standard qwerty keyboard. Participants 
were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to the 
direction of each target arrow, and to ignore its location. They first 
completed a 24-trial practice phase, during which the experimenter 
remained in the room to offer further advice if necessary. Subsequently, 
participants completed six experimental blocks of 72 trials each. Within 
each block, all eight conditions (2 prime-compatibility × 2 location-
congruency × 2 responses) were fully randomized and appeared with 
equal frequency. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2012 • volume 8(1) • 38-49 41
Prime
(33 ms)
Mask
(100 ms)
Empty
(50 ms)
Target
(100 ms)
>>
>>
<<
>>
compatible incompatible
congruent incongruent
Participants started each new block whenever they felt ready to do 
so. In the second part of the experiment, participants completed the 
ZSDS and the ZSAS. The experiment lasted approximately 30 min in 
total. Written fully informed consent was obtained prior to the experi-
ment, and participants were reminded again at the end that they had 
the right to withdraw their data without explanation.
data aNalySiS
anxiety and depression scores 
After reversing the scores for reverse-scored items, participants’ an-
swers to the 20 questions in each questionnaire (from 1 for the lowest 
to 4 for the highest indicator of anxiety/depression) were summed. The 
lowest possible score for each questionnaire thus was 20, the highest 
was 80. For direct comparison of low- versus high-scoring participants, 
a median split was conducted (separately for each questionnaire), and 
participants who produced the exact median score were excluded from 
that analysis. For correlations between behavioral measures and anxi-
ety/depression scores, all participants were entered into the analysis.
reaction times (rts) 
Trials were grouped according to the preceding trial’s location-
congruency  (congruent,  incongruent),  the  current  trial’s  location-
congruency (congruent, incongruent), and the current trial’s prime-
compatibility (compatible, incompatible). Taking into account only 
trials where both the current and the preceding response were correct, 
each participant’s mean RTs were calculated for these eight trial types. 
Additionally, post-error RTs were calculated by averaging RTs of all 
correct responses following an incorrect response (due to insufficient 
numbers of trials, this could not be done separately for individual trial 
types).
rt effects 
To account for overall RT differences between participants (more 
than 200 ms between the fastest and the slowest responder), RT effects 
were calculated as ratios rather than as differences: 
1. Post-conflict slowing (PCS) as the ratio of mean RT on all trials 
following a location-incongruent trial (“previous incongruent”, PI) 
to the mean RT on all trials following a location-congruent trial 
(“previous congruent”, PC);
2. Simon effects as the ratio of mean RT on location-incongruent 
trials to mean RT on location-congruent trials, separately for PC 
and PI trials; 
3. Gratton effect as the ratio of PC Simon effect to PI Simon ef-
fect;7 
4. NCEs as the ratio of mean RT on prime-incompatible trials to 
the mean RT on prime-compatible trials;
5. Post-error slowing (PES) as the ratio of post-error RTs to mean 
(post-correct) RTs.
Figure 1.
stimulus material and trial structure. the figure depicts a compatible congruent and an incompatible incongruent trial, both requiring 
a right-hand response.
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error rates and exclusion criteria 
Because error rates were very low (< 5% on average), most statisti-
cal analyses of error rates were invalidated by floor effects. In order to 
at least partly overcome this problem, we collapsed across the factor 
prime-compatibility (for which we had no predictions regarding any 
interaction with either anxiety or depression scores). Thus error rates 
were calculated for cC, cI, iC, and iI trials, separately for trials following 
a correct and trials following an incorrect response.
Two participants were excluded from all statistical analyses because 
of insufficient numbers of valid trials (less than 10 for one or more trial 
type). One further participant was excluded because of excessively slow 
responses (overall mean RT more than 2.5 SDs above the group mean), 
leaving a sample of 80 participants.
Statistical analyses 
RTs of the complete data set were analyzed using a repeated meas-
ures ANOVA with the within-subject factors location congruency on 
the Previous Trial (congruent, incongruent), Location Congruency of 
the current trial (congruent, incongruent), and Prime Compatibility 
of the current trial (compatible, incompatible). Post-error slowing was 
analyzed using a univariate ANOVA. Next, these analyses were repeat-
ed (a) with Anxiety (high, low) as a between-subject factor (excluding 
participants with median scores on the anxiety questionnaire), and 
(b) with Depression (high, low) as a between-subject factor (exclud-
ing participants with median scores on the depression questionnaire). 
Follow-up analyses were carried out in form of partial correlations 
between affect scores and mean RTs, and between affect scores and RT 
effects. When correlating with anxiety scores, depression scores were 
controlled for, and when correlating with depression scores, anxiety 
scores were controlled for. 
Error rates were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
the between-subject factors Anxiety Group (high, low) and Depression 
Group (high, low), and the within-subject factors Previous Response 
(correct, incorrect), Previous Location-Congruency (congruent, incon-
gruent), and Current Location-Congruency (congruent, incongruent).
Results
aNxiety aNd depreSSioN ScoreS
Scores on the anxiety scale (M = 32.8, SD = 6.83, range: 22-51,   
Mdn = 31) were significantly lower than scores on the depression scale 
(M = 37.6, SD = 7.70, range: 21-62, Mdn = 37), t(79) = 7.48, p < .001.   
Of  the  80  participants,  35  scored  below  and  38  scored  above  the 
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Figure 2.
error  rates  (%)  as  a  function  the  four  location-congruency  trial  types  (cc  =  previous  congruent,  current  congruent;  ci  =  pre-
vious  congruent,  current  incongruent;  ic  =  previous  incongruent,  current  congruent;  ii  =  previous  incongruent,  current  in-
congruent),  and  for  errors  committed  after  a  correct  response  and  after  an  incorrect  response,  plotted  separately  for  par-
ticipants with either low (dark grey) or high (light grey) depression scores, and low (solid lines) or high (dashed lines) anxiety  
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median anxiety score, and 39 scored below and 35 scored above the 
median depression score. However, even the higher-scoring groups 
remained well below the mid-point of the scale for both measures. 
As expected, anxiety and depression scores were highly correlated,   
r = .698, p < .001.
error rateS
Error  rates  are  depicted  in  Figure  2.  Error  rates  following  an 
incorrect  response  were  significantly  lower  than  those  following  a 
correct response (post-error adjustment), lower following a location-
incongruent trial than following a congruent trial (PCS), and lower 
on location-congruent than on incongruent trials (Simon effect), all   
Fs(1, 64) > 27.0, all ps < .001. All two- and three-way interactions 
between  these  factors  (i.e.,  Gratton  effect  and  post-error  modula-
tions) were also highly significant, all Fs(1, 64) > 45.0, all ps < .001.8 
Furthermore, Depression Group interacted significantly with Current 
Location-Congruency, F(1, 64) = 6.0, p = .017, MSE = 721.90, as par-
ticipants with elevated depression levels produced larger Simon effects 
(i.e., produced more errors on location-incongruent trials) than par-
ticipants with low depression levels. There was no main effect of either 
Anxiety or Depression, and no other interactions with these factors, all 
Fs < 3.5, all ps ≥ .06.
In order to explore the effect of anxiety and depression on er-
ror  rates  and  post-error  adjustments  without  distortion  by  floor 
effects,  we  analyzed  cI  trials  in  isolation.  The  analysis  confirmed 
that  participants  in  the  high-depression  group  produced  more  er-
rors  and  larger  post-error  adjustments  than  participants  in  the 
low-depression group, both Fs > 4.2, both ps ≤ .043 (both effects re-
mained when covarying anxiety scores, both Fs > 4.1, both ps ≤ .047).   
In contrast, anxiety levels did not affect error rates or post-error adjust-
ments on cI trials, all Fs < 1 (with or without covarying depression   
scores).
reactioN timeS
Figure 3 shows mean RTs (across all participants) for each of the eight 
trial types. Overall, responses were faster following a location-congru-
ent than following a location-incongruent trial (PCS), F(1, 79) = 63.91,   
p < .001, MSE = 210.09; faster with location-congruent than with loca-
tion-incongruent targets (Simon effect),  F(1, 79) = 275.40, p < .001, MSE 
= 899.62; and faster with prime-incompatible than with prime-compat-
ible targets (NCE), F(1, 79) = 72.47, p < .001, MSE = 337.12. Simon ef-
fects following location-incongruent trials were much reduced (in fact, 
numerically reversed) relative to Simon effects following location con-
gruent trials (Gratton effect), F(1, 79) = 376.04, p < .001, MSE = 764.47.
The  two-way  interactions  between  Previous  Trial  and  Prime 
Compatibility,  and  between  Location  Congruency  and  Prime 
Compatibility, were non-significant, both Fs < 1; however, there was 
a significant three-way interaction between Previous Trial, Location 
Congruency,  and  Prime  Compatibility,  F(1,  79)  =  5.98,  p  =  .017,   
MSE = 113.36.
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effectS of aNxiety aNd depreSSioN oN rtS: 
group aNalySiS
Repeating the analysis with Anxiety (low group, high group) as a 
between-subject factor (Figure 4, top panel) showed that the two-way 
interaction of Previous Congruency × Anxiety and the four-way inter-
action of Previous Congruency × Current Congruency × Compatibility 
× Anxiety approached significance, both Fs(1, 71) > 2.95, both ps < .10. 
However, when depression scores were entered as a covariate, these 
effects disappeared, both Fs < 2.1, both ps ≥ .15. No other effects of an-
xiety even approached statistical significance, neither with nor without 
covarying depression scores, all Fs < 2.1, all ps ≥ .15. 
A different picture emerged when using Depression (low group, 
high group) as the between-subject factor (Figure 4, bottom panel). 
Participants  with  higher  depression  scores  showed  significantly 
larger Simon effects than participants with low scores, F(1, 72) = 5.97,   
p  =  .017,  MSE  =  896.87,  and  this  difference  became  even  more 
pronounced  when  anxiety  scores  were  entered  as  a  covariate,   
F(1, 71) = 6.46, p = .013, MSE = 896.03. No other effects of depres-
sion were statistically significant, neither with nor without covarying   
anxiety scores, all Fs < 3.8, all ps > .05. 
Overall  post-error  slowing  (PES)  was  significant,  as  indicated 
by a one-sample t-test, t(79) = 5.44, p < .001, but this effect was not 
modulated by either anxiety or depression, all Fs < 1. As the error rate 
analysis (see above) suggested that reliable effects might be restricted 
to cI trials, we repeated the RT analysis for these trials separately, but 
obtained the same result (i.e., significant PES, but no modulation by 
anxiety or depression). 
effectS of aNxiety aNd depreSSioN oN rtS: 
correlatioN aNalySiS
To explore these effects in more detail, correlations between anxiety 
(depression) scores and RT measures were calculated, partialling out 
scores from the respective alternative scale. A first series of analyses 
showed that patterns of correlation were driven mainly by a trial’s (cur-
rent and previous) target congruency, whereas prime compatibility did 
not appear to contribute. Therefore, RTs were averaged across compat-
ible and incompatible trials. 
As shown in Table 1, anxiety scores showed a weak positive correla-
tion with RTs, which was significant for all but location-incongruent 
responses following an incongruent trial. In contrast, depression scores 
tAble 1. 
results of Partial correlations Between Anxiety scores (controlled for depression scores) and reaction times, and of Partial correlations 
Between depression scores (controlled for anxiety scores) and reaction times.
Conrolled for
    Previous congruent     Previous incongruent
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Depression score Anxiety score r   .268   .157   .225   .259
p   .017   .166   .046   .021
Anxiety score depression score r -.225 -.070 -.158 -.135
p   .046   .538   .165   .234
df     77    77    77    77
Note. Bold numbers indicate significant correlations. 
tAble 2. 
results of Partial correlations Between Anxiety scores (controlled for depression scores) and reaction time effects, and of Partial 
correlations Between depression scores (controlled for anxiety scores) and reaction time effects.
Controlled for
pcS ncE
overall 
Simon 
effect
pc
 Simon 
effect
pI
Simon 
effect
Gratton 
effect
pES
Depression score Anxiety score r   .149   .006 -.124 -.165 -.013 -.142 .046
p   .191   .959   .278   .146   .908   .212 .690
Anxiety score depression score r -.030 -.002   .221   .243   .094   .157 .054
p   .796   .989   .050   .031   .411   .168 .639
df    77    77    77    77    77    77  77
Note. All reaction time effects are expressed as ratios (see Method section). PCS = post-conflict slowing. PC = previous trial congruent. PI = previous trial 
incongruent. PES = post-error slowing. Bold numbers indicate significant correlations.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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showed a weak negative correlation with RTs, which was significant 
only  for  location-congruent  responses  following  a  congruent  trial. 
Results of the partial correlations between anxiety (depression) scores 
and the various measures of inhibitory control are given in Table 2. 
They confirm the pattern observed in the ANOVAs: Whereas there 
was no systematic link between anxiety and the magnitude of any of 
the RT effects, depression scores correlated positively with Simon ef-
fects (particularly with Simon effects following a congruent trial).
dIScuSSIon
The present study investigated whether subclinical levels of anxiety 
and depression impair inhibitory control of responses to affectively 
neutral visual stimuli. Specifically, we analyzed effects of anxiety while 
controlling  for  depression  scores,  and  effects  of  depression  while 
controlling for anxiety. Using a hybrid masked prime-Simon task, we 
measured the NCE as an index of low-level online (within-trial) inhibi-
tion; the Simon effect as an index of high-level online inhibition; and 
post-conflict slowing (PCS), Gratton effect, and post-error adaptation 
(PES and post-error error reduction) as indices of high-level adaptive 
(between-trial) inhibition. All of these effects were significant, showing 
that overall, participants were influenced by and adjusted their behav-
ior to the different stimulus conditions. 
However, behavioral modulations by elevated levels of anxiety and 
depression were limited, and were restricted to a small subset of meas-
ures. To some extent, this might have been due to the limited range 
of anxiety and depression scores: More wide-ranging effects might 
have been obtained with higher variability of anxiety and/or depres-
sive symptoms. However, even with the generally low symptom levels, 
systematic effects could be observed. In particular, increased levels of 
anxiety were found to be associated with a slight increase in overall 
reaction times (RTs), whereas increased levels of depression were as-
sociated with enlarged Simon effects both for error rates (driven by an 
increased error rate on incongruent trials) and for RTs (driven mainly 
by decreased RTs on congruent trials preceded by a congruent trial 
[cC trials]). Clearly, these results do not provide strong support for the 
notion of generalized inhibitory deficits in subclinical anxiety and de-
pression. A more parsimonious explanation seems to be that increased 
anxiety is linked to a generally more cautious approach to the task, as 
expressed by increased RTs, whereas increased depression is linked to 
a more careless approach, as expressed by decreased RTs when the im-
mediately preceding context has provided congruent (i.e., conflict-free 
or “trustworthy”) information.
Although the existing literature on inhibitory control frequently 
focuses on behavioral adjustments following conflicting information 
(e.g., Egner, 2008), adjustments following conflict-free trials are, in fact, 
more commonly observed in response-conflict tasks. In a recent study 
(Schlaghecken & Martini, 2011), we demonstrated that between-trial 
behavioral adjustments in a variety of response-conflict paradigms can 
be modeled by a mechanism of context-dependent mirror-symmetri-
cal “tightening” and “relaxing” of the visuo-motor system’s responsive-
ness, rather than by a mechanism of selective conflict detection and 
adjustment. According to this model, if after a congruent, conflict-free 
trial the system relaxes too much, its responsiveness will increase to 
an extent that even task-irrelevant distractor information can cause 
response execution. If the required response is the same as the one 
triggered by the distractor (congruent trial), this will merely result 
in very fast responses. However, if the required response differs from 
the one triggered by the distractor (incongruent trial), it will result in 
a (very fast) error. Thus if relaxing the perceptuo-motor system’s re-
sponsiveness too much after a conflict-free trial is behaviorally  risky, 
then it seems reasonable to assume that an efficient cognitive control 
system would prevent such exaggerated relaxation. The present results 
therefore indicate a lack of efficiency or “bluntedness” (Steele et al., 
2007) of cognitive control functions associated with heightened levels 
of subclinical depression symptoms.
In this context it is also worth noting that neither anxiety nor de-
pression levels affected low-level inhibition (as measured by the NCE). 
This is of particular interest in the context of recent results regarding 
the NCE in normal aging. It is generally accepted that depression and 
normal aging share certain neurophysiological characteristics, such as 
decreased dopamine and serotonin receptor density in regions asso-
ciated with both low level (basal ganglia) and high-level (ACC and dlP-
FC) inhibitory control (e.g., Kaasinen et al., 2000). As older participants 
consistently fail to produce NCEs at the masked prime-target interval 
employed in the present experiment (Maylor et al., 2011; Schlaghecken 
& Maylor, 2005), one would have expected to see a similar trend in 
the more depressed participants. This was not the case, suggesting that 
subclinical levels of depression do not mimic an aging brain (at least 
not with respect to inhibitory perceptuo-motor control).
Relationship of the present 
findings to previous studies  
of inhibitory control  
in anxiety and depression
Although clinical levels of anxiety and depression are generally believed 
to be associated with inhibitory deficits (e.g., Channon & Green, 1999; 
Kaiser et al., 2003), the evidence that the same is true for subclinical 
levels of anxiety and depression symptoms is rather sparse. Regarding 
subclinical anxiety, inhibitory deficits have usually been obtained in 
affective response conflict tasks (e.g., Schrooten & Smulders, 2007; 
Sehlmeyer et al., 2010) and in response conflict tasks requiring atten-
tional control (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2010, 2011; Avila & Parcet, 
2002). Together with these studies, the present findings confirm the 
view that at least at subclinical levels, anxiety-related deficits in cogni-
tive control reflect situation-specific (particularly threat-specific) atten-
tional dysregulation or over-vigilance (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001), 
rather than a non-specific deficit in perceptuo-motor inhibition.
Regarding subclinical depression, the existing evidence for an in-
hibitory deficit is somewhat mixed. For instance, Pizzagalli et al. (2006), 
measuring inhibitory control in a non-affective Eriksen flanker task, 
found that participants with elevated levels of depressive symptoms 
failed to show post-error adjustment in the form of increased accuracy 
following an incorrect response. However, depressive symptoms did AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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not modulate the flanker congruency effect, the Gratton effect, or post-
error slowing (PES). Holmes and Pizzagalli (2007) observed the same 
pattern of results in a Simon task, but only when participants had been 
given (fake) negative feedback.9 In contrast, the present experiment 
found  both  larger  Simon  effects  and  larger  post-error  adjustments 
with higher levels of depression. There are various methodological 
differences between those studies and the present one, from different 
stimuli (colored circles and squares vs. arrows) to different inter-trial 
intervals (2.3-3.3 s vs. 1.46 s), to different probabilities of congruent 
and incongruent trials (biased towards congruent in the Holmes and 
Pizagalli study vs. equal probabilities in the present experiment), any 
of which might have affected the different patterns of results. However, 
taken together, the overall picture emerging is not one of sub-clinical 
depressive symptoms being strongly associated with perceptuo-motor 
inhibitory deficits.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the present study is the 
finding that to the extent that heightened anxiety versus heightened 
depression symptoms affect behavioral control at all, they do so in 
contrasting ways. Liotti and Tucker (1995; as described in Liotti & 
Mayberg, 2001) proposed that anxiety mostly affects ventral cortico-
limbic structures including the inferior temporal and the orbitofrontal 
cortex, assumed to support object processing and focused attention, 
whereas depression mostly affects dorsal cortico-limbic structures in-
cluding the dlPFC and inferior parietal cortex, assumed to be involved 
in spatial processing and the control of externally directed attention 
(see  also  Liotti  et  al.,  2000).  In  the  present  study,  requiring  non-
affective spatial processing, increased levels of subclinical anxiety and 
increased levels of subclinical depression were associated with specific, 
non-overlapping impairments (increased RTs but unaffected inhibitory 
effects vs. unaltered RTs but increased Simon effects). Such a dissocia-
tion appears to be in line with a two-systems model. However, further 
research is required to determine the exact extent to which “over-cau-
tiousness” versus “over-relaxation” of the perceptuo-motor system are 
associated with increased levels of subclincial anxiety and depression,   
respectively. 
footNoteS
1 Our notion of inhibitory control here is most closely related – 
though not identical – to the concept of suppression of a prepotent 
response  tendency  (e.g.,  Miyake  et  al.,  2000).  However,  the  neural 
processes underlying inhibitory effects are not yet fully understood, as 
even phenomena generally assumed to reflect cognitive and/or motor 
inhibition might, in fact, be comprised of inhibitory (reducing neural 
excitability) and excitatory (increasing neural excitability) components 
(e.g., Schlaghecken & Martini, 2011). We will return to this issue briefly 
in the Discussion.
2 However, a substantial NCE-like effect occurs at a disproportio-
nal delay in most of these participants (Maylor et al., 2011).
3 One might note that Boy et al. (2010) reported larger NCEs in 
participants with lower levels of gamma-amino-butyric-acid (GABA). 
This might be considered of relevance in the current context, as GABA 
levels are generally found to be lowered in anxiety and depression 
(for a review, see Kalueff & Nutt, 2007). However, Boy et al.’s finding 
was specific for the supplementary motor area (SMA) of the frontal 
lobes, an area that is not implicated in anxiety or depression disorders 
(Kaleuff & Nutt, 2007). Consequently, we do not see a reason to pre-
dict larger NCEs for participants with higher anxiety and depression   
scores.
4 If interference suppression breaks down completely, an incor- 
rect response will be given on the majority of incongruent trials.
5  In  this  paradigm,  masked  primes  do  not  produce  reliable   
Gratton effects (Schlaghecken, Refaat, & Maylor, 2011), and prime-
compatibility of the previous trial was therefore not considered in the 
present study.
6  Note that according to the first account, large PES indicates strong 
anticipatory cognitive control, whereas according to the latter two, 
it  indicates  weak  online  inhibitory  control  (overcoming  erroneous 
processes) and weak attentional control (withdrawing attention from 
a past event), respectively. To the extent that all three processes might 
play a role in generating PES, the value of this effect as an indicator of 
inhibitory strength is somewhat limited.
7 As Simon effects are already ratios, Gratton effects could have 
been  calculated  as  differences  between  these  without  confounding 
effect magnitude with overall RTs. However, we felt that it would be 
preferable to present all effects in the same format. Statistical analysis 
of difference-Gratton effects produced a similar pattern of results to 
the one reported here.
8  However, inspections of Figure 2 suggests that most (possibly all) 
of these effects might be due to floor effects, as appreciable numbers 
of errors only occurred on cI (incongruent following congruent) trials 
when the previous response had been correct.
9 In the same study, however, elevated levels of depression were as-
sociated with a reduced Gratton effect – independent of feedback – in 
a Stroop task.
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